

## Extract from **A History of the Askin Government 1965-1975**

by Dr. Paul Loughnan

### **The Sydney Opera House**

The Sydney Opera House has become an Australian icon and has received worldwide acclaim, including its recognition as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. However, the Sydney Opera House has not always been held in such esteem and had been a nagging issue for NSW state governments since its conception. From the time that the Danish architect Jørn Utzon was announced the winner of the Sydney Opera House design competition in 1957 until its formal completion in 1973, the Sydney Opera House was shrouded in controversy. The principal protagonists in the controversy were Utzon, the Cahill Labor Government that instigated the project and the Askin Government that completed it. All three deserve their share of criticism. As forty years have now passed since the completion of the Sydney Opera House, the actions of the protagonists can be discussed from a more objective perspective. When the events are viewed in the context of the time, it is remarkable that such a masterpiece was conceived, financed and completed. Therefore, all of the three parties also deserve their rightful accolades.

The Sydney Opera House controversy reached its climax in February 1966 when Utzon resigned as architect, which precipitated criticism in all directions. Davis Hughes accused the former Labor Government of inept management in allowing the costs to spiral out of control. According to Hughes, this occurred because the Government had allowed construction to commence before the full plans and specifications were made available.<sup>1</sup> Critics of Utzon supported the Government in its endeavour to stem the spiralling costs.

Sydney newspapers reflected the range of community views. The *Daily Mirror* claimed that the aesthetic importance of the building was more important than the financial cost which was financed through the opera house lottery with no imposition

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<sup>1</sup> *NSW LA PD*, Session 1965-66, 1 March 1966, p.3673.

on state finances. The editorials in the *Daily Mirror* blamed Hughes for using Utzon as a scapegoat for the preceding Labor government's "inertia and bungling". The *SMH* and the *Sun* attempted to present more objective viewpoints but only the *SMH* based its analysis on a detailed assessment of the issues.<sup>2</sup>

Davis Hughes was Deputy Headmaster at The Armidale School from 1947 until 1950 when he won the seat of Armidale for the CP at a by-election after Drummond had resigned to enter Federal politics as the member for New England. In 1956 he regained the seat after he had lost it to the ALP candidate, James Cahill, in 1953 by thirteen votes. Hughes held the seat until 1973. He was the Minister for Public Works from 1965 until 1973 whereby he oversaw the completion of the Sydney Opera House. After its completion in 1973 Askin rewarded him for his effort with the plum position as NSW Agent General in London.

Hughes had already attracted controversy before he became embroiled in the Sydney Opera House saga. In 1958 he was hospitalised after suffering a nervous breakdown. This was eight months after he was elected deputy leader of the CP. It had come to light that Hughes had misrepresented his academic qualification in Hansard and the Parliamentary records. It had been inaccurately recorded that Hughes held a BSc degree. He was aware of the error and he had deliberately allowed it to stand. Subsequently, Hughes resigned from the deputy leadership, explained and apologised to the parliament and then decided to retire from politics. The CP members rallied and convinced him to stand at the 1959 election. Hughes retained the seat with an increased majority. His supporters claimed that this result exonerated him from his indiscretion. Nevertheless, the duplicity regarding his university qualifications cast doubt over his integrity. This provided his detractors with the ammunition to assassinate his character, especially during his tumultuous tenure as minister responsible for the Sydney Opera House project.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Australian Political Chronicle January-August 1966', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 12, No.3, p434.

<sup>3</sup> Davey, *The Nationals*, pp.171-178.

After the resignation of Utzon, a deputation consisting of Professor Denis Winston (Dean of the Faculty of Architecture, Sydney University), high-profile architect Harry Seidler, writer Patrick White, and President of the Society of Sculptors, W.N. Nicholson, met with Askin on 3 March 1966 seeking a resolution of the problem. They presented a petition, consisting of 3000 signatures including their own. The petition stated “we the undersigned, would like to express the strong opinion that it will be impossible for any architect other than Jørn Utzon to finish the Sydney Opera House in the spirit in which it was conceived and request his reinstatement”.<sup>4</sup>

The Sydney Opera House project was opposed by both sides of politics. Despite this, Premier Cahill insisted that construction begin in February 1958 just before the election, despite the fact that the brief and designs were incomplete.<sup>5</sup> On 7 March 1957, Askin asked the question in parliament, “Is the present the right time to push ahead with this desirable but lavish venture?”<sup>6</sup> Three weeks later on 2 April 1957, Cahill suggested to the parliament that four lotteries be held each year to raise £240,000 annually for the Sydney Opera House. This suggestion was met by the Opposition leader Morton with disdain.<sup>7</sup> Credit must be given to Cahill who had to fight for his vision of the Sydney Opera House. In June 1957 he averted a split at a meeting of the Labor caucus, sections of which opposed the Sydney Opera House project.<sup>8</sup>

The project officially began on 2 March 1959 when Cahill laid a plaque to celebrate the commencement of stage 1. Stage 1, which involved the construction of the podium and foundations, was completed on 1 February 1963, two years behind schedule. Stage 2, which entailed the construction of the roof shells, began in early 1963. The avant garde design required skills and technology to be pioneered during construction and “took four years of intensive calculations to implement the

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<sup>4</sup> Australian Political Chronicle January-August 1966', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 12, No.3, pp.431-432.

<sup>5</sup> Peter Jones, *Ove Arup: Masterbuilder of the Twentieth Century*, New Haven, 2006, p.185.

<sup>6</sup> Philip Drew, *Utzon and the Sydney Opera House*, Annandale, 2000, p.47 .

<sup>7</sup> *ibid*, p.47.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid*, p.48.

architects' essential ideas".<sup>9</sup> For example, the elements sketch provided by Utzon for the competition was structurally impractical and so it was necessary for the structural engineering firm, Ove, Arup and Partners, to work in conjunction with Utzon to develop a ribbed shell system based on the geometry of a sphere. Despite this problem being solved, the time and cost of the project became a public concern by the time that the Askin Government came to office in 1965. This resulted in Askin undertaking at the election to set up an enquiry into the completion plans and cost of the project.<sup>10</sup>

Hughes, the Minister for Public Works, was prompt in carrying out the pre-election promise of the Askin Government to investigate fully the "deplorable bungle of the finances" behind the Sydney Opera House, which began on 31 August 1965.<sup>11</sup> A report from the quantity surveyors, Rider Hunt and Partners, was presented to the Cabinet. The Cabinet supported Hughes' proposed government policy which he outlined in a statement to the Parliament on 3 November 1965. Hughes stated that the government was determined to take the necessary action to change the situation.<sup>12</sup> He claimed that the ineptitude of the Labor Government was responsible for the escalation of estimated completion costs which, according to Rider, Hunt and Partners, grew from £4.8m to £12.5m and then to £24.7m. Hughes asserted that this significant escalation in costs was even more significant when considering the fact that no provision had yet been made for a patrons' car park, an organ and compensation to the Maritime Services Board for loss of the wharves or payment for the site.<sup>13</sup>

Hughes concluded that Stage 2 of the project had made satisfactory progress. The cost had increased from £1.8m to approximately £5.9m; however, it had been a complex task exacerbated by the problems associated with the construction of the

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<sup>9</sup> 'Australian Political Chronicle January-August 1966', *AJPH*, p.434.

<sup>10</sup> Jones, *Ove Arup*, p. 187.

<sup>11</sup> Liberal Party, 1965 Election Policy Speech, ML 329.994, p.29.

<sup>12</sup> *NSW LA PD*, Session 1965-66, 1 March 1966, p.1696.

<sup>13</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 31 August 1965. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House DECISION: Hughes proposal outlined in the Cabinet Minute dated 25 August 1965 was approved.

stage tower which had been brought forward from stage 3 to stage 2.<sup>14</sup> According to Hughes, the delay and spiralling costs caused by the previous mismanagement of the project were manifested in the problems associated with stage 3 of the project. Rider, Hunt and Partners found that Utzon had not supplied plans for stage 3 despite requests from the previous government. Utzon, moreover, had decided on suppliers for stage 3 without following the required tendering process. Rider, Hunt and Partners recommended that stage 3 should not proceed without adequate plans. The lack of competitive tendering could also have resulted in higher than necessary costings. The finishes for stage 3 were complex and the work would need to be closely managed to avoid an escalation in costs. Rider, Hunt and Partners also advised that it was of paramount importance that the implementation of tight project management controls must not prejudice the high standards which such a building deserved.<sup>15</sup>

In light of the surveyor's report, Hughes presented a plan to the parliament on 3 November 1965 outlining how the Askin Government would complete the Sydney Opera House project. The Government intended to implement a single line of authority whereby the architect would be responsible to Hughes as Minister of Public Works.<sup>16</sup> The Minister would have sole financial control over the project which would include payments to the architect and the consultants. Competitive tendering would be mandatory except for extraordinary circumstances; for example, if only one supplier was expert in a particular task. Following this new management approach, the surveyors intimated that the completion date would be December 1969. Hughes advised the Parliament that the Government intended to "ensure that it is completed to a high standard, in complete harmony with the conception of the architect who designed it".<sup>17</sup>

Under the Labor Government, the builder was paid by the Department of Public Works, while the architect and the consultants were paid on vouchers which were presented to the opera house committee and paid by the Department of Local

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<sup>14</sup> *NSW LA PD*, Session 1965-66, 1 March 1966, p.1697.

<sup>15</sup> *NSW LA PD*, Session 1965-66, 1 March 1966, p.1702.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*, p.1697.

<sup>17</sup> *NSW LA PD*, Session 1965-66, 3 November 1965, p.1695.

Government. The architect chose his suppliers without competitive tendering and work began without appropriate drawings.<sup>18</sup> Hughes argued that this was a weakness and insisted that the only way the project could be effectively completed was by incorporating network analysis into the planning approach. This allowed the project plan for the work to be integrated. The plans and specifications would be completed before commencement to enable tendering to be called by specific dates. These would act as milestones to allow the work schedule to progress seamlessly.

Before stage three could begin, Hughes insisted that Utzon provide final working drawings and tendering documents in a reasonable timeframe. The construction of the window mullions, the provision for the laminating trusses to support the plywood in the auditoria, and the cladding and paving of the podium area involved substantial funds. These challenges would therefore be met under a single line of authority using the system of network analysis.<sup>19</sup>

On 28 February 1966 Utzon resigned. In his letter of resignation, he gave non-payment of a £51,000 fee and the lack of cooperation from the Department of Public Works as his reasons for resigning. These claims were denied by Hughes in his letter to Utzon on 28 February 1966. Hughes had disputed the fees as the work had been done before April 1960. Also, the decision for the fees was to be made by the end of the week of 28 February 1966. Hughes reminded Utzon that the fees of \$20,000 per month had been approved subject to monthly reviews of the progress. Hughes did not concede that there had been a lack of collaboration. He believed that collaboration had been achieved through the monthly meetings between himself, Utzon and representation of the Opera House committee.<sup>20</sup>

In the Cabinet meeting minutes 1 March 1966, Hughes outlined the problems of implementing his “single line authority” with Utzon and the system of network analysis. Utzon had recommended the use of plywood sheets 55’ by 5’ for the construction of the ceiling of the auditoria. However, the consulting engineers were

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<sup>18</sup> *NSW LA PD*, Session 1965-66, 3 November 1965, p.1698.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 1 March 1966. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House -

Resignation of Architect. Decision Terms of a Press statement proposed by Hughes were endorsed.

of the opinion that this method of construction was unsafe. On this advice Hughes refused to approve the construction of prototypes costing \$120,000. Utzon had also awarded Symonds Limited a \$2m contract to install the plywood, despite the fact that Symonds was in receivership.<sup>21</sup>

There is no doubt that Hughes knew there would be a confrontation with Utzon over the Askin Government's policy. Hughes had warned the Cabinet on 31 August 1965 that this policy "could lead to a dispute" with Utzon.<sup>22</sup> He went to great lengths in his statement to the parliament to outline the government policy and hinted that Utzon would resign. Renshaw appeared to have been suspicious when he asked why Hughes was making this statement to the House. Hughes maintained his line of argument that the Sydney Opera House project problems were the result of previous mismanagement, and claimed "because I am showing the necessity for action to change the situation".<sup>23</sup> Hughes had anticipated Utzon's resignation and had devised a method whereby the Sydney Opera House could be completed with a government architect and services of the senior officers of the NSW Chapter of the Institute of Architecture. However, there is no evidence that Hughes deliberately precipitated the resignation of Utzon.<sup>24</sup> As a contemporary commentator remarked; The more likely explanation for Utzon's resignation was that he was not comfortable with

the government's desire to establish a more forthright administrative control over construction and finances - a control which would have greatly restricted the freedom Mr Utzon had enjoyed under three successive Labor premiers. Utzon viewed the close client-architect relationship which the minister demanded as a slight upon his status and calibre as an architect. As he said in his letter of resignation to the minister: '... you have forced me to leave the job ... as I see that you do not respect

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<sup>21</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 1 March 1966. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House DECISION: Approval was given in broad terms to Hughes' Minute 28 February 1966 regarding the continuation of stage 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 31 August 1965. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House DECISION: Approved Hughes' Minute 25 August 1965 presented at Cabinet meeting 31 August 1965.

<sup>23</sup> *NSW LA PD*, Session 1965-66, 3 November 1965, p.1696.

<sup>24</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 1 March 1966. SUBJECT; Sydney Opera House. Resignation of Architect DECISION: Approval was given in broad terms to Hughes' Minute 28 February 1966 regarding the continuation of stage 2.

me as an architect.' But as far as the government was concerned, it was only trying to curb the spiralling costs.<sup>25</sup>

By the time of his departure, Utzon had received fees to the value of \$1.25m.<sup>26</sup> The Government regretted that Utzon had resigned. Askin wasted no time in making it clear that "the architect had resigned of his own free will".<sup>27</sup> Nonetheless, the Askin Government has sometimes been portrayed as comprising a bunch of philistines who chased the sensitive genius Utzon out of the country.<sup>28</sup> Hughes in particular had been accused of being the principal perpetrator. This was dispelled in a letter from Utzon to Philippa Hughes after her husband's death on 16 March 2003. The letter was released by the Hughes family to the *SMH* and printed on 14-15 October 2006. Utzon's letter read as follows:

Please believe me. I'm very sorry I didn't get to talk to him. Please tell her that I'm very lucky that the building was finished at all. Sydney got that building because of him and his support of Peter Hall and Hall Todd and Littlemore architects. He gave them all the best support. I'm sorry I didn't get time to tell him.

How can a man who has never built anything follow in the same way I was intending? The architecture wasn't the same but you can't repair Beethoven's symphony by asking Mozart to repair the second half.

I am very sorry I had difficulties in meeting him. He was completely sincere in his dealing with me and what he said about the costs and what kind of a theatre he could build in Armidale for 25 million pounds. My wife is here. She knows what a difficult thing it was to have a husband working on it.

Say to Phillipa she must have my kisses and my comfort for his passing. I'm so grateful the building had his enormous force behind the project and he finished it. It was because of him that the complicated building was finished at all.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> 'Australian Political Chronicle January-August 1966', *AJPH*, Vol. 12, No.3, p.431.

<sup>26</sup> 'Australian Political Chronicle September-December 1966', *AJPH*, Vol. 13, No.1, p.112.

<sup>27</sup> *NSW LA PD*, Session 1965-66, 1 March 1966, p.3673.

<sup>28</sup> Fife, *A Country Liberal*, p.107.

<sup>29</sup> *SMH*, 14-15 October 2006.



On 19 April 1966 after Utzon's resignation, Hughes implemented his contingency plan.<sup>30</sup> He appointed E.H. Farmer, the Chief Government Architect, to oversee a panel of leading architects in private practice. The panel included Peter Hall, who was in charge of design, David Littlemore, who took on the role of supervisor, and Lionel Todd, who was responsible for the contractual documents.<sup>31</sup> Utzon left the country almost immediately after his resignation and did not consult with the Public Works Department or his successors in the planning of the remaining work.<sup>32</sup> The Government and the panel were left with the dilemmas of inaccurate estimates of completion costs, no provision for a patrons' car park and the original concept of the major hall jeopardised.

The then current completion cost estimate for the Sydney Opera House of \$48.4m had been received by the government on 24 July 1965. This had been accepted by Utzon who had then added \$1m as a contingency in his budget estimates. The Government rejected these estimates as inaccurate as they did not make allowance for the patrons' car park or other associated costs.

Under the 1963 Opera House Amendment Bill, the maximum permitted expenditure was \$26.5m. In order to continue the project for the next 12 months, \$10m was needed from the special lottery fund. Sourcing the funds from the lottery meant that no further demand was made on government loans and revenue. The Cabinet agreed to Hughes' proposal and legislation was subsequently drawn up. A petition to prevent the completion of the Sydney Opera House without Utzon was presented to the Attorney General. In response to this, Hughes proposed that the completion of the Sydney Opera House, in accordance with the winning design, be sanctioned by the parliament. This step was necessary in order to stymie any court challenges which could slow the progress of the project. A car park was also added

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<sup>30</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 1 March 1966. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House. Resignation of Architect DECISION: Approval was given in broad terms to Hughes' Minute 28 February 1966 regarding the continuation of stage 2.

<sup>31</sup> 'Australian Political Chronicle January-August 1966', *AJPH*, Vol.12, No.3, p.432.

<sup>32</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 10 May 1966. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House, Proposed amendment to the Sydney Opera House Act, 1960-3 DECISION: Approval was granted "along the lines" proposed in Hughes' Minute 4 May 1966.

to the scope of the work to be completed.<sup>33</sup> The bill was subsequently passed by both houses of parliament without amendment. W.F. Sheahan, the ALP member for Burrinjuck, and a senior minister in the previous government, praised Hughes for his handling of the Sydney Opera House Project.<sup>34</sup>

There was no requirement made for a patrons' car park in the terms of the international competition. It was considered that there was ample parking within easy walking of the Sydney Opera House. Therefore there was no provision made for a car park in the Opera House Act of 1960.<sup>35</sup> By 1965 there was limited parking near the Sydney Opera House due to the expansion of the city and it was deemed essential that parking would need to be provided for the Sydney Opera House patrons. The Sydney Opera House Trust had been established by an act of parliament in 1961 to oversee the building and site and was accountable to the Minister for Arts. The Trust established a committee to investigate the parking requirements and the recommendation of the committee to build a 1000 bay car park was approved by the Trust and endorsed by the Cabinet.<sup>36</sup>

The expenses for the car park project were to be drawn from the Sydney Opera House fund while the control of the parking facility after construction was to be placed with the Sydney Opera House Trust. The construction was to be the responsibility of the Minister for Public Works. This involved finding a suitable location and then sourcing expert advice in order to arrive at a suitable design. Hughes also intended to investigate day and night traffic-flows by way of a survey to ensure that the parking station would adequately cater for the needs of the Sydney Opera House patrons.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 10 May 1966. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House, Proposed amendment to the Sydney Opera House Act, 1960-3 DECISION: Approval was granted "along the lines" proposed in Hughes' Minute 4 May 1966.

<sup>34</sup> 'Australian Political Chronicle September-December 1966', *AJPH*, Vol.13, No.1, p.112.

<sup>35</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 29 March 1966. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House – car parking for Patrons. DECISION: Approval was given for a sub-Committee to make enquiries into the Car Park, recommended by Hughes in his Minute 16 March 1966.

<sup>36</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 24 May 1966, SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House \_ Car Parking DECISION: The recommendations of the Cabinet Sub-Committee ... as set out in the Cabinet Minute of the Minister for Public Works, dated the 19 May 1966, were endorsed.

The Labor Government had appointed M.R.Hornibrook (NSW) P/L as head contractor for stage three, subject to the settlement of satisfactory terms and conditions being agreed. Hornibrook was responsible for stage two, and the work was considered highly satisfactory by the Askin Government. Funds had been provided for stage three by the 1966 amended Sydney Opera House bill and it was necessary to begin without delay in order to ensure an easy transition without unnecessary additional expense.<sup>38</sup>

There is no doubt that Utzon's design and vision for the Sydney Opera House was a masterpiece in architectural and aesthetic terms. However, the legacy he left for the planning of stage three proved to be problematic. The flaws in Utzon's specifications surfaced when the architectural panel reviewed the program for completing stage three.<sup>39</sup>

The original competition specified that two halls were to be built. The major hall was to seat 3000 to 3500 patrons but this was revised down to 2800. The amenity would encompass concerts, large scale opera, ballet and dance, choral and pageants, and mass meetings. The proposed minor hall would provide 1200 seats for the use of drama, intimate opera, chamber music, concerts and recitals and lectures. The competition also specified that ideal conditions of acoustic, visual and stage and orchestral interaction were to be facilitated without compromise.<sup>40</sup>

Utzon's specifications failed to meet these criteria. In 1958 Utzon claimed that the major hall would accommodate 2800 people. At this stage the problem of the construction of the shells had not been factored into the estimated available space inside the building. When the shell problem was solved, it resulted in a reduction in the available space for the major hall. As a result, the major hall would no longer be

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<sup>38</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 25 October 1966, SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House. DECISION: Cabinet approved the proposal of the Minister for Public Works...in his Cabinet Minute, dated 20 October, 1966.

<sup>39</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 21 March 1967. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House, "Review of Programme" by Architectural Panel. DECISION: Hughes' Cabinet Minute was approved which concerned the two halls.

<sup>40</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 21 March 1967. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House, "Review of Programme" by Architectural Panel. DECISION: Hughes' Cabinet Minute was approved which concerned the two halls.

able to accommodate 2800 patrons. Nonetheless, Utzon's last proposal included a concert hall that he claimed would seat 2800, a minor drama hall for 1,100, an experimental theatre seating 450, a chamber music hall seating 300 and a large rehearsal hall for opera, orchestra and drama.

When the architectural panel examined Utzon's plans they found that the 2800 seats were designed against the advice of the acoustic consultants. They concluded that 2,250 was reasonable but in reality only 1800 seats could provide comfort for the patrons. The capacity of the chamber music theatre was also overstated and the rehearsal hall was inadequate for a full orchestra.<sup>41</sup>

It became clear that because of the lack of space under the shells it was impossible to achieve the expectations of the original competition. The decision to be made was whether the major hall would be a first class orchestra concert hall or a multi-purpose concert hall which would cater for ballet and opera. If it was a multi-purpose hall, then as a concert hall it would be of a second class standard, even with a seating capacity of 2000. As a opera and ballet theatre it would have been better than the minor hall but not of a first-class standard. The minor hall was adequate for ballet and opera and superior to other venues available in Sydney at the time. If the major hall was to be a first class concert hall and seat 2800 people, the stage machinery would have to be discarded. The stage machinery had already been installed; if it was to be made redundant, the total cost, including removal, would amount to \$3,572,000.

In March 1967, Hughes recommended that the "Review of Progress" by the architectural panel be approved by the Cabinet. It was advised that the major hall should be constructed as a first-class concert hall seating 2800 patrons (with the stage machinery removed). The minor hall would be constructed as a first-class auditorium for 1500 people adequately able to cater for ballet and opera, albeit with some shortcomings. The original experimental theatre was to be upgraded to a high quality drama theatre seating 700 people. The former rehearsal hall would become an experimental theatre seating 300 people. The workshop area, which was

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<sup>41</sup> *ibid.*

originally attached to the major hall was to become a cinema, seating 750; the store area to be used as a chamber music theatre seating 450; and the original chamber music theatre to be a rehearsal room and reception area. The space occupied by the now defunct stage machinery was to become an orchestral rehearsal hall.

Hughes approved the recommendations on the premise that the main objective of the Sydney Opera House was to encourage cultural development but not exclusively for opera and ballet. Hughes also noted that grand opera and ballet were becoming unfashionable at the time and that the hall would be satisfactory in the immediate future for these two art forms. It was concluded that sacrificing some flexibility in the major hall would enable the overall complex to provide an excellent balance of facilities.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> *Cabinet Papers*, 21 March 1967. SUBJECT: Sydney Opera House, "Review of Programme" by Architectural Panel. DECISION: Hughes' Cabinet Minute was approved which concerned the two halls.